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Abstract
To accurately predict behavior economists need reliable measures of individual
time preferences and attitudes toward risk and typically need to assume stability
of these characteristics over time and across decision domains. We test the
reliability of two choice tasks for eliciting discount rates, risk aversion, and
probability weighting and assess the stability of these characteristics over time
and across situations. We find high reliability and that individual characteris-
tics are remarkably stable over time. The estimated parameters correlate well
with self-reported decisions in financial domains, but are largely uncorrelated with
decisions in other important life domains involving intertemporal trade-offs and risk.
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1 Introduction
Many important economic and societal decisions involve outcomes that are delayed or
uncertain. Consequently, individual time preferences and attitudes toward risk are of
fundamental importance for economic models. Beyond that they also play an important
role in research on human decision making in other social sciences, like psychology and
neuroscience (see,e.g., Kirby et al. 1999, Trepel et al. 2005, Kable and Glimcher 2007, Fox
and Tannenbaum 2011).
In order to make accurate predictions, economic research and applications need re-
liable instruments for measuring individual preferences. Moreover, typically it needs to
be assumed that individual preferences are stable over time and across various decision
contexts. Despite their obvious importance to the validity of economic research and the
effectiveness of policy implementations, these assumptions have not been sufficiently ad-
dressed in the literature (Borghans et al. 2008). In this paper we provide an assessment of
the reliability of commonly used experimental time and risk preference elicitation tasks.
In addition, we explore the temporal stability of elicited discount rates, risk aversion, and
probability weighting over several weeks and ask whether they generalize to important
domains of life outside the laboratory.
In economics, using experiments and surveys, time and risk preferences are usually
quantified based on real or hypothetical behavior in decision making tasks. Subjects are
asked to make several decisions involving uncertain and/or delayed (monetary) rewards.
It is typically assumed that these tasks are reliable measures, i.e. that their results are
reproducible and measurement error is small. However, the actual reliability of these tasks
is largely unknown. Knowledge about reliability is important, however. If reliability is low,
elicited preferences in one task cannot be expected to be temporally stable or correlate well
with behavior in other settings, simply due to high measurement error. Hence, only with
reliable instruments accurate assessments about temporal and across-domain stability of
preferences can be made.
When using elicited time preferences and attitudes toward risk to explain field behavior
and derive potential policy implications, one needs to assume that a person’s decisions
in such tasks reflect underlying dispositions that are stable, both over time and across
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different decision situations. That is, a person’s preferences at one point in time have to
be assumed to be predictive of her preferences at another point in time, and preferences
in one life domain have to be predictive of preferences in a different domain. However,
behavior in choice tasks, even if suitably incentivized, need not necessarily reflect longer-
lasting, all-encompassing attitudes of the individual towards every type of risk or delay.
Instead, it might be highly dependent on the subject’s state or the decision context (Fox
and Tannenbaum 2011). Whether and how time and risk preferences are stable over time
and across different decision domains is an important, ultimately empirical question that
economists have only recently begun to address.
Investigating the temporal stability of time preferences, Kirby (2009) and Meier and
Sprenger (2010b) both found that discount rates elicited in a monetary intertemporal
choice task were relatively stable over a period of one year. Although many different
elicitation methods for time preferences have been explored (see Frederick et al. 2002, for
review), there is little evidence on the stability of individual time preferences across dif-
ferent choice contexts. The few studies that have investigated how elicited discount rates
relate to field behavior find mixed results. Whereas Ashraf et al. (2006) and Meier and
Sprenger (2010a) reported that present bias in an intertemporal choice task is associated
with credit card debt and preference for a commitment savings product, Chabris et al.
(2008) as well as Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) found that experimentally elicited dis-
count rates correlate only very weakly with health-related behavior such as exercising and
smoking. Interestingly, Reuben et al. (2009) observed that discount rates over monetary
rewards predicted procrastination on an unpleasant task.
Evidence on the stability of risk attitudes over time and across domains is equally
scarce, despite the many empirical studies on risk taking (see Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012,
for a recent review). Andersen et al. (2008b) found that individual risk aversion measured
with a typical multiple price list (Holt and Laury 2002) was only moderately stable over
time and also Zeisberger et al. (2012) observe considerable instability of risk aversion
and probability weighting over a period of one month. First field studies addressing
the stability of risk aversion across different contexts suggest that many individuals do
not exhibit comparable degrees of risk aversion in different life domains, such as health,
disability or car insurance (Barseghyan and Prince 2011, Einav et al. 2012). Pennings and
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Smidts (2000) found that responses in an experimental lottery choice task were correlated
with managerial decisions involving risk, providing some initial support for the construct
validity of such tasks.
In this paper we address the questions of reliability of measurement of time prefer-
ences and attitudes toward risk and their stability over time and decision domains in
one encompassing study. We use intertemporal choice tasks and lottery choice tasks that
have been frequently used in economic research (e.g. Andersen et al. 2008b, Chabris et al.
2008, Bruhin et al. 2010, Dohmen et al. 2010, Ifcher and Zarghamee 2011). In each task,
subjects decide repeatedly between different amounts of money that are associated with
varying delays in intertemporal choice, or with varying winning probabilities in lottery
choice. Subjects’ choices are used to derive parameter estimates describing the individ-
ual’s discount rate, risk aversion and degree of nonlinear probability weighting. We assess
reliability of preference elicitation techniques by correlating the individual results from
mutually exclusive choice subsets. Establishing good reliability provides the foundation
for estimating the stability of preferences over time and addressing questions of ecological
validity. In order to estimate test-retest stability, we repeated the experiment on a subset
of subjects after several weeks and correlate parameter estimates derived at the two dif-
ferent test dates. Lastly, to contribute towards establishing validity of these measurement
techniques across decision domains, we report correlations of estimates of time preferences
and risk attitudes with conceptually related self-report scales that include questions on
self-control, future orientation, savings, and risk attitudes.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the used choice tasks
produce behavioral measures that are reliable and provide reproducible estimates. Second,
all estimated measures show high intertemporal stability over a period of 5–10 weeks.
Hence, we can conclude that the elicited time preferences, risk aversion, and probability
weighting are stable at least over the tested period of time. Third, we find that the elicited
preferences are predictive for (self-reported) choices in life domains related to financial
decisions, like investments and savings. However, they are largely unrelated to decisions
in other important life domains involving delayed and risky consequences, like health and
leisure. Overall, our results indicate that the explored elicitation tasks can be useful for
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predicting behavior regarding intertemporal and risky financial decisions but are likely
uninformative for behavior outside the narrow financial realm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our design
and procedures. Section 3 reports the results on reliability, stability, and domain speci-
ficity first for the measure of time preferences followed by the measures of risk aversion
and probability weighting. Section 4 offers a discussion of our results and concludes.
The appendices offer additional descriptive statistics and tests (Appendix A), details on
questionnaires (Appendix B), and contain the experiment instructions (Appendix C).
2 Design and Procedures
We conducted experiments where we measured time preferences and risk attitudes of
participants. All subjects completed a series of choices between smaller-sooner and larger-
later amounts of money as well as a series of choices between guaranteed and probabilistic
payments, all of which were fully incentivized. After the decision tasks, subjects completed
a set of questionnaires measuring general and specific dimensions of impulsiveness and
self-assessed risk attitudes in various domains of life. In order to assess the intertemporal
stability of estimated time and risk preferences, a subset of subjects was asked to return
to the lab for the same experiment 5–10 weeks after the first data acquisition. All tasks
and questionnaires are described more specifically below. At the end of this section details
on the experimental procedure are given.
Measuring Time Preference
A set of intertemporal decision problems over monetary rewards was used to assess time
preference. Subjects faced 27 choices between a smaller-sooner and a larger-later amount
of money. For example, subjects were asked “Would you prefer to receive e 25 today or
e 30 in 80 days?”. Smaller-sooner amounts ranged from e 11 to e 54, and the larger-later
amounts ranged from e 25 to e 60. Delays ranged from 7 days to 200 days. All choice
problems were presented individually and in no obvious logical order, following a sequence
suggested by Kirby et al. (1999).
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The set of intertemporal choices that we used consisted of 3 subsets of 9 choices each.
Set 1 contained items from the intertemporal choice questions introduced by Kirby et al.
(1999). These questions ask the subject to choose between an amount to be paid out
immediately after the experiment session and a larger amount available after a delay of d
days. In order to assess whether subjects exhibit time inconsistent behavior we created
two more sets of 9 items each. Specifically, we modified the items of set 1 by adding a
fixed delay of one day (set 2) or 14 days (set 3) to both the sooner and the later amount.
Consequently, the smaller-sooner amounts in set 2 were paid out after one day and the
larger-later amounts after d + 1 days. In set 3 all smaller-sooner amounts were paid out
after 14 days and all larger-later amounts after d+ 14 days.
We used these choice sets to estimate an exponential discount parameter ρ for each
subject and each choice set according to
V = Ae−ρD, (1)
where V denotes the current subjective value of the delayed amount, A denotes the mon-
etary amount, and D the delay in days.1
Table 1 shows the values and delays used for all 27 intertemporal choices subjects
had to make as well as the order of presentation. In the table the intertemporal choice
questions are ordered into the three sets described above. Within each set the questions are
sorted according to the discount rate that would make an individual indifferent between
the two options.2 As can be seen from the table, within each set, choices range from
requiring extreme patience when preferring the later option (e.g. choosing to wait 186
days to receive e 35 instead of e 34 immediately) to extreme impatience when preferring
the sooner option (e.g. going for immediate e 19 instead of waiting 7 days to receive
e 30). Subjects with time preferences that lie in between these extremes will prefer the
1Several specifications for individual discount rates are feasible. Importantly, our results do not depend
on the specification of the discount rate. The ρ values are not estimated by fitting an exponential function
to the data, but are determined by subjects’ switching points between smaller-sooner and large-later
amounts. Moreover, as will be shown later, our subjects did not exhibit a present bias, which makes an
exponential specification appropriate.
2We used a slightly different version of set 3 for the first 96 subjects in the first experiment. The set
displayed in the table turned out to cover the range of subjects’ choices better.
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Table 1: Intertemporal Choice Tasks
Set Order Smaller- Larger- Days Days Indifference
of sooner later to smaller to later ρ
presentation amount amount amount amount
1
13 e34 e35 0 186 0.00016
20 e28 e30 0 179 0.00039
26 e22 e25 0 136 0.00094
22 e25 e30 0 80 0.00228
3 e19 e25 0 53 0.00518
18 e24 e35 0 29 0.01301
5 e14 e25 0 19 0.03052
7 e15 e35 0 13 0.06518
11 e11 e30 0 7 0.14333
2
1 e34 e35 1 187 0.00016
6 e28 e30 1 180 0.00039
24 e22 e25 1 137 0.00094
16 e25 e30 1 81 0.00228
10 e19 e25 1 54 0.00518
21 e24 e35 1 30 0.01301
14 e14 e25 1 20 0.03052
8 e15 e35 1 14 0.06518
27 e11 e30 1 8 0.14333
3
9 e34 e35 14 200 0.00016
17 e28 e30 14 193 0.00039
12 e22 e25 14 150 0.00094
15 e25 e30 14 94 0.00228
2 e19 e25 14 67 0.00518
25 e24 e35 14 43 0.01301
23 e14 e25 14 33 0.03052
19 e15 e35 14 27 0.06518
4 e11 e30 14 21 0.14333
Note. For presentation in this table, questions are grouped into the three sets.
Within each set, they are ordered according to the exponential discount rate that
would make a decision maker indifferent between the two options. Column 2
indicates the position in the order of presentation to the subjects.
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smaller-sooner option up to a given point—their switch point—and prefer the larger-later
option in all remaining tasks. For them the discount rate lies in the interval between the
two indifference parameters of the tasks where the switch occurs. We use the geometric
mean of this interval as an estimate of the discount rate in that case (cf. Kirby et al.
1999). When a subject displayed more than one switch point within a set, the discount
rate was assigned such that it minimized the number of choices that would have been a
mistake according to this value.3 This procedure was applied separately for each of the
three intertemporal choice sets, yielding three estimates for the discount rate per subject,
which we denote as ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3.
Measuring Risk Preference
When assessing attitudes toward risk we estimate the curvature of each subject’s value
function as well as the degree of nonlinear probability weighting (Kahneman and Tversky
1979). For that we elicit certainty equivalents for 20 lotteries. Each lottery was presented
to the subjects on a decision screen that showed the specific lottery as well as a list of
20 sure amounts. Lotteries were described in written form and probabilities were also
visualized as a pie chart in order to facilitate comprehension. The sure amounts ranged
from the higher to the lower outcome of the specific lottery and were equally spaced. For
each of these sure amounts, subjects had to indicate whether they preferred to receive the
lottery or this sure amount. In each decision screen subjects were allowed to switch only
once between preferring the sure amount and preferring the lottery, i.e. monotonicity was
enforced in this task.4
For each lottery the certainty equivalent was determined as the arithmetic mean of the
smallest sure amount the subject preferred over the lottery and the next smaller amount
on the list. All lotteries consisted of two non-negative outcomes in the range of e 0 to
3It turned out that within one intertemporal choice set most subjects answer consistently, i.e. they
display a single switch point (85.8% of all subjects were consistent in all three sets and 93.9% of all sets
were answered consistently). Only two subjects displayed multiple switch points in all three choice sets.
We excluded them from the analysis of the intertemporal choice task.
4See Epper et al. (2009, 2011) and Bruhin et al. (2010) for successful implementations of this procedure.
The experiment instructions shows a screenshot of a decision screen of one lottery (see Appendix C, p. 38).
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Table 2: Lotteries in the Lottery Choice Task
Order px1 x1 x2 Order px1 x1 x2
9 0.1 e12 e6 7 0.25 e30 e12
13 0.5 e12 e6 19 0.5 e30 e12
6 0.9 e12 e6 17 0.75 e30 e12
11 0.05 e24 e6 2 0.95 e30 e12
18 0.25 e24 e6 20 0.05 e90 e30
3 0.5 e24 e6 1 0.5 e6 e0
12 0.75 e24 e6 8 0.5 e12 e0
14 0.95 e24 e6 5 0.05 e24 e0
4 0.05 e30 e12 10 0.95 e30 e0
16 0.1 e90 e0 15 0.25 e24 e0
Note. Outcomes x1 and x2 are stated in Euro, px1 denotes
the probability for outcome x1. Order denotes the position
in the order of presentation to the subject.
e 90, probabilities attached to these outcomes ranged from 0.05 to 0.95. The full set of
lotteries as well as the order of presentation are shown in Table 2.5
Elicited certainty equivalents were used to jointly estimate a value function and a
probability weighting function for each subject. When choosing the functional forms we
were guided by requirements of parsimony and past evidence indicating good fit of data.
Regarding the value function it has been shown that a simple power function
v(x) = xα, x ≥ 0, α > 0, (2)
where x denotes the monetary value of the outcome, is the best compromise between
these requirements (Stott 2006, Wakker 2008, Bruhin et al. 2010). It is also conveniently
interpreted as 0 < α < 1 indicates risk aversion, α = 1 indicates risk neutrality, and α > 1
indicates risk seeking.
5Since we were mainly interested in individual variability in this task, we presented the lotteries in the
same order to all participants. Since no lottery was resolved before the end of the experiment, no history
effects are expected. Any potential effects of the order of presentation should affect all subjects equally.
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To capture probability weighting we use a parametrization originally suggested by
Prelec (1998) (see also Epper et al. 2009),
ω(p) = exp(−(− ln p)γ), 0 < γ < 1, (3)
where p denotes the objective probability. This specification allows for subproportionality
and is inverse S-shaped, properties in line with previous empirical evidence (Gonzalez and
Wu 1999, Stott 2006, Bruhin et al. 2010, Epper et al. 2011). The degree of deviation from
linearity is conveniently captured by the single parameter γ, where smaller values refer
to larger deviations in the form of an inverted S-shape. That is, small probabilities are
overweighted and large probabilities are underweighted.
For each subject, α and γ were estimated simultaneously by minimizing the squared
distance between the estimated subjective value of the lottery and the measured certainty
equivalent. To correct for heteroscedasticity, the outcomes of each lottery were normalized
to uniform length.
Self-Reported Impulsiveness and General Risk Attitudes
In order to investigate how behavior in the monetary choice tasks in the laboratory relates
to the conceptually close psychological measure of impulsiveness and to (perceived) risk
preferences in various life domains subjects completed a series of questionnaires.
Impulsiveness is a psychological construct that is thought to be closely related to
intertemporal choice. The inability to delay gratification is considered the core problem
of impulsive behaviors, for example when the immediate pleasure of eating sweet food is
preferred over the delayed health benefits associated with refraining from it (Ainslie 1975,
Logue 1988). Likewise, in economics it is assumed that an intertemporal choice between
an immediately available and a delayed reward requires self-control and that impatience is
exacerbated by impulsiveness (Laibson 1997, Frederick et al. 2002, McClure et al. 2004).
The evidence on the association of impulsiveness with intertemporal choice tests is mixed,
however (Kirby et al. 1999, Reynolds et al. 2006, de Wit et al. 2007, Reimers et al. 2009).
For the purpose of this study, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) was employed
(Patton et al. 1995). The BIS-11 is a well-validated and standardized self-report question-
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naire for measuring impulsiveness.6 There is ample evidence that high scores on the BIS-11
are associated with behaviors that reflect a lack of self-control and future-orientation, such
as smoking, alcohol and illegal substance abuse, attention deficits, as well as a higher sen-
sitivity to reward and punishment (for a review, see Stanford et al. 2009). Next to a sum
score that reflects general impulsiveness, the BIS-11 allows computing a subscore for non-
planning impulsiveness. This subscore is supposed to capture interindividual differences
in self-control and future-orientation that are often assumed to contribute to individual
differences in intertemporal choice behavior.
To assess self-reported willingness to take risks in different domains of life subjects
completed a risk taking questionnaire from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Specifically, subjects answered questions regarding their general risk attitudes (“Generally
speaking, are you a person who is ready to take risks or are you trying to avoid risks?”) as
well as questions about risk taking in six specific domains: car driving, financial matters,
leisure and sports, health, professional career, and confidence in strangers. Table 3 shows
the precise wording of the questions. We used these questions because it has been shown
that answers to them are significantly related to actual behavior in the field regarding
investment in stocks, being self-employed, participating in sports, and smoking (Dohmen
et al. 2011). Therefore, (non-)correlations between the laboratory measures and answers to
these questions can be viewed es indicative for the ecological (in)validity of those measures.
General Procedure
The data acquisition took place at the Behavioral and Experimental Economics laboratory
(BEElab) of the School of Business and Economics at Maastricht University. Subjects
were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 2004) from the BEElab subject pool which consists
of students of all fields of study at Maastricht University, the majority being students of
business or economics. In total, 144 students participated in the experiment, 50.7% of
these were female, 75% were enrolled in the School of Business and Economics. The time
interval between the first time a subject was tested, and the retest ranged from 5 to 10
weeks. We invited about two-thirds of the original subjects for the retest. Subjects did not
6Table B.1 in Appendix B shows the questionnaire.
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Table 3: Questions for Self-Reported “Attitudes Towards Risk”
Generally speaking,
are you a person who is ready to take risks or are you trying to avoid risks?
One can behave differently in different circumstances.
In the following circumstances, how would you assess your readiness to take risks?
Driving a car?
Making a financial investment?
In leisure and when doing sports?
Regarding your professional career?
Regarding your health?
Regarding confidence in strangers?
Note. Subjects rated each item on a scale from 0 (unwilling to take risks) to 10 (fully
prepared to take risks) (see Dohmen et al. 2011).
know that they were invited for the same experiment. In total 53 participants returned
for the retest.7
All decisions and questionnaires were presented on a computer screen using the software
package z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were
informed that there would be several decision making tasks and that they will receive
detailed instructions before each task. They were allowed to make their decisions at their
own speed.
Subjects received a show-up fee of e 3 in cash. In addition, one of all decisions
made during the experiment was selected at random, the subject’s choice in this decision
situation was implemented and the associated earnings were paid out. This procedure
allowed us to provide salient incentives for several tasks while minimizing the problem
that decisions might be influenced through house money effects or risk hedging.8 In case
7In the results section, the retested group is compared to those subjects that did not return for the
retest in order to assess whether the retest data is affected by selective dropout of subjects. There are no
significant differences in the tested variables between retested and non-retested subjects.
8Hey and Lee (2005) have shown that subjects’ behavior is in line with the assumption that each
decision is considered as an independent decision under this incentive scheme.
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a lottery was selected for payout, risk was resolved by a random draw of the computer.
Subjects received detailed information on the payment procedure at the beginning of the
experiment and were again reminded of the determination of earnings before each of the
different decision making tasks.
All earnings — except delayed ones — were paid out in private immediately after
the experiment in cash. Delayed payments were delivered by bank transfer in order to
minimize transaction costs.9 On average, the experiment lasted 1.5 hours. Total earnings
ranged from e 3 to e 129.50, with an average of e 27.55.
3 Results
In the following, we first describe the data on time preferences, and second the data on
risk preferences. The central questions addressed are: First, how reliably does each task
measure individual preferences? Second, how stable are individual preferences over the
two separate test dates? In addition, for time preferences we ask how well the elicited
preferences correlate with psychological constructs of impulsiveness? For risk preferences
we also explore the association between the laboratory measure and validated self-report
questions in different decisions domains. In the beginning of each section, descriptive
statistics are presented in order to compare results to the existing literature and to check
for general effects of repeated testing and selective drop-out. If not otherwise indicated
reported correlations are Spearman rank-order correlations and p-values refer to two-sided
tests.
Time preferences
At both test dates subjects made decisions in three sets of intertemporal choice tasks.
For each of these sets we calculated exponential discount rates, denoted ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3,
9Money in a Dutch bank account is accessible at virtually no transaction costs, since payment by debit
card is widely accepted and a large number of conveniently situated ATMs is available 24h and free of
charge. We therefore are confident that the difference in transaction costs between immediate and delayed
payments is negligible.
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respectively, for each subject. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of these discount rates
for both test dates. The results are in keeping with discount rates reported in studies
using a similar procedure or procedures that involve comparable reward sizes and delays
(see Thaler 1981, Chabris et al. 2008, Kirby 2009, and Frederick et al. 2002 for a review).
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Time Preferences
N Median Mean 95% CI of Mean
Date 1
whole
sample
ρ1 0.00821 0.00685 [0.00538, 0.00872]
142 ρ2 0.00821 0.00622 [0.00499, 0.00776]
ρ3 0.00737 0.00694 [0.00558, 0.00862]
Date 1
retest
subsample
ρ1 0.00821 0.00646 [0.00430, 0.00970]
53 ρ2 0.00821 0.00540 [0.00377, 0.00773]
ρ3 0.00737 0.00602 [0.00415, 0.00875]
Date 2
ρ1 0.00821 0.00589 [0.00382, 0.00907]
53 ρ2 0.00821 0.00620 [0.00422, 0.00911]
ρ3 0.00821 0.00618 [0.00401, 0.00953]
Note. As discount rates are positively skewed, reported mean
discount rates are based on log-transformed values (Kirby 2009)
and reported means correspond to the geometric means of the
discount rates. For the same reason, confidence intervals are
reported instead of standard errors; lower and upper bounds were
determined on the log-transformed values and then transformed
back into the original space.
In total, 53 subjects returned for the retest. To test whether our results from the
retested sample might be biased by selective dropout, we compared the distribution of
date 1 discount rates of those that returned for the retest (N = 53) and those that did
not (N = 89). Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests indicate that discount rates
were not significantly different between these two groups (p ≥ 0.354).10 We take this as
10Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney test statistics of all pairwise comparisons can be found in
Table A.1 in Appendix A.
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indication that — with respect to the variable of interest — there is no selection effect on
the data obtained at test date 2.
Reliability. In order to test the reliability of the measured discount rates, we correlated
the individual estimates obtained from the three different sets within one test date. All
correlations are high (Spearman’s Rho ≥ 0.80, see Table 5), which means that subjects
who discount steeply when there is an immediate reward available do so very consistently
also when there is no immediate reward available. This indicates that measurement error
in the intertemporal choice task is small.
Table 5: Discount Rates - Reliability and Stability
Within-Session Correlations Test-Retest
Date 1 (N = 142) Date 2 (N = 53) Correlation Date 1
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 with Date 2 (N = 53)
Avg. ρ 0.95*** 0.93*** 0.88*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.92*** 0.68***
ρ1 0.87
*** 0.80*** 0.94*** 0.85*** 0.61***
ρ2 0.80
*** 0.90*** 0.68***
ρ3 0.67
***
Note.
*** p < .001; intercorrelations (Spearman’s Rho) of discount rate estimates from three
non-overlapping choice sets within the same test session, both for test date 1 and test date 2
(Within-Session Correlations). Test-retest correlations (Spearman’s Rho) of discount rates
estimated at two separate test dates using the same choice set (Test-Retest).
Note, that this result contrasts with the influential view that immediate rewards are
valued separately from delayed rewards (Laibson 1997, McClure et al. 2004), which gives
rise to present bias. To further explore this, we tested whether discount rates obtained
from our choice set 1 (with immediately available options) are higher than those obtained
from the other two sets (without immediately available options). We find that the three
estimates for ρ do not differ significantly, neither at test date 1 (Friedman Test, χ2 = 1.369,
p = 0.490, N = 142), nor at test date 2 (Friedman Test, χ2 = 1.714, p = 0.432, N = 53).
That is, our subjects are not systematically less patient when the smaller-sooner reward
is available immediately, the next day, or in 14 days. Hence, we do not find evidence for a
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present bias, which casts some doubt on the generality and robustness of this result (see
also Dohmen et al. 2012).11
Stability. In the aggregate, discount rates are stable across the two test dates. That is,
for the subsample of all subjects that were tested twice, the discount rates do not differ
between the two test dates (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests, all p ≥ 0.152). In order to
assess stability on the individual level, we correlated the measured discount rates across
the two test dates. Figure 1 plots the individual discount rates measured at date 2 against
those measured on date 1. We find that discount rates measured at the two dates are
highly correlated (Spearman’s Rho ≥ 0.61, see also Table 5), indicating that subjects who
discount steeply at one test date do so also at the second test date.
Domain Specificity. In both the economic and the psychological literature it is often
assumed that intertemporal choice invokes a self-control problem, which results in impa-
tient choice behavior (Laibson 1997, Frederick et al. 2002, McClure et al. 2004, Fudenberg
and Levine 2006, Berns et al. 2007). In fact, monetary intertemporal choice tasks, like the
one used in the present study, are often employed to measure impulsiveness (e.g. Kirby and
Finch 2010, Figner et al. 2010, Crockett et al. 2010). There is, however, no clean evidence
on the actual association between such monetary measures and any other psychological
construct of impulsiveness.12
We assessed how strongly behavior in the intertemporal choice task is related to impul-
siveness by correlating the estimated discount rates with the total score of the BIS-11 as
well its subscale ‘Nonplanning Impulsiveness’, which is conceptually most closely related
to intertemporal choice (see Section 2). In addition, we correlated the discount rates with
selected individual items that ask for self-control, saving, spending, and future orientation,
11Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) also do not find evidence for hyperbolic discounting. They, however,
use a different presentation format (calendar dates) than we and most studies that report to find hyperbolic
discounting do (time distance). It has been shown that calendar date presentation can indeed mitigate
hyperbolic discounting (Read et al. 2005).
12For some earlier attempts to explore this relationship, see Reynolds et al. (2006), de Wit et al. (2007),
Kirby and Finch (2010), Verdejo-Garc´ıa et al. (2010).
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Note: For each intertemporal choice set, the discount rate at the second test date is plotted as a function
of the discount rate at the first test date, together with univariate histograms of each estimated discount
rate. Cloud is jittered.
Figure 1: Test-Retest Data for Discount Rates.
core factors that are believed to contribute to intertemporal choice behavior (Frederick
et al. 2002).13
We find a small significantly positive correlation between the estimates for the discount
rate and items relating to saving and spending behavior (see Table 6, items 10 and 25).
That is, people who report to rarely save and to spend more than they earn are less patient
13Table A.2 in Appendix A reports the test-retest correlations for this questionnaire (overall as well as
single items). These are generally high.
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Table 6: Correlations of Discount Rates with Self-Reported Impulsiveness
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (N = 142)
Total Subscale Item 8 Item 10 Item 25 Item 27
Score Nonplanning Self-Control Saving Spending Present
Average ρ −0.03 0.00 −0.01 0.19* 0.18* 0.01
ρ1 −0.03 −0.02 0.01 0.18
* 0.13 0.00
ρ2 −0.05 −0.02 0.05 0.18
* 0.19* −0.03
ρ3 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.17
* 0.20* 0.03
Note.
* p < .05; correlations (Spearman’s Rho) at test date 1.
in the intertemporal choice task. However, responses to an item directly addressing the
individual’s future-orientation (“I am more interested in the present than in the future”)
are uncorrelated with the elicited discount rates (Table 6, item 27). Discount rates are also
not correlated with responses to the item “I am self-controlled”, the subscale “Nonplanning
Impulsiveness” or the total sum score of the BIS-11. To check the robustness of these
results, we analyzed data of an independent sample that was measured at a different point
in time. In this data set we find a similar pattern. The discount rate again correlated
most strongly with self-report items on saving and spending.14
To summarize, we find that discount rates elicited in a monetary intertemporal choice
task are highly correlated for three different intertemporal choice sets and we observe good
test-retest correlations for discount rates over an interval of 5–10 weeks. This shows that
the used choice task has satisfactory reliability and that time preferences over monetary
rewards are remarkably stable over time.
However, we also find that the elicited discount rates do not correlate with self-reported
impulsiveness and we do also not observe time inconsistent behavior in the intertemporal
choice task. Our results thus add to accumulating evidence suggesting that intertem-
poral decisions over monetary rewards are not, or only very weakly related to general
impulsiveness and lack of self-control.
14These results are reported in Table A.5 in Appendix A.
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As Borghans et al. (2008) suggest, this could be due to the fact that a typical intertem-
poral choice task in an economic experiment does not mimic self-control problems outside
the lab very well. Alternatively, what is referred to as ‘time preference’ and ‘self-control’
might differ across situations within one individual. For example, people might be very
concerned about their future health, but not so much about their future financial situation
(see Frederick et al. 2002). This idea is supported by our observation that discount rates
over money correlate most strongly with self-report items on spending and saving behavior,
and not at all with aggregate measures of self-reported impulsiveness. Hence, discount-
ing monetary payoffs in a lab experiment seems to relate specifically to those everyday
decisions that involve money. This interpretation is also in line with the observation that
discount rates for different types of outcomes, such as health, money and chocolate, are
at most moderately correlated (Chapman 1996, Reuben et al. 2010, Tsukayama 2010).
Together, our findings indicate that behavior in an intertemporal choice task is stable
over time and captures individual discount rates reliably. How patiently someone acts,
however, seems to be domain specific.
Risk Attitudes
Descriptive statistics for the parameter estimates of the curvature of the utility function
and the probability weighting function are shown in Table 7. At both test dates we observe
moderate levels of risk aversion (median α = 0.746 at date 1 and 0.717 at date 2), which
are in keeping with earlier results (Andersen et al. 2008a, Bruhin et al. 2010). With regard
to the probability weighting function we observe a median γ of 0.413 (date 1) and 0.339,
which correspond to pronounced deviations from linear probability weighting (γ = 1).
These estimates are also in line with earlier results (Epper et al. 2009, 2011, Bruhin et al.
2010). When testing for differences at date 1 in estimated risk aversion and probability
weighting between subjects that were retested (N = 53) and those that did not return
for the retest (N = 91), Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests did not return
significant results at the 5 percent level.15 We take this as evidence that — regarding the
15For α, p ≥ 0.071, and for γ, p ≥ 0.263; detailed test results are reported in Appendix A Table A.1.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Risk Attitudes
N Median Mean 95% CI of Mean
Date 1
144
α 0.746 0.784 [0.726, 0.843]
whole sample γ 0.413 0.442 [0.398, 0.485]
Date 1
53
α 0.693 0.715 [0.649, 0.781]
retest subsample γ 0.391 0.410 [0.340, 0.480]
Date 2 53
α 0.717 0.659 [0.570, 0.748]
γ 0.339 0.374 [0.306, 0.441]
variables of interest — any potential selection effect in the retested subsample is negligible.
Reliability. We assessed reliability of these measures of risk attitudes using a split-half
procedure. For that purpose, the set of all 20 lotteries was split into two non-overlapping
sets using an odd-even split of the lottery numbers. The estimation procedure was then
repeated for all odd and all even numbered lotteries separately and the resulting parameter
estimates were correlated. If the estimated parameters were distorted by erratic choice
behavior and, hence, not reliably measured, then the estimates from the two sets should
not be highly correlated. We find that the resulting split-half correlations are in fact
very high (Spearman’s Rho ≥ 0.78), indicating that the estimated parameters are highly
reproducible (see Table 8 for all correlations). Hence, our data suggest that the used lottery
choice task is a reliable method for measuring risk aversion and probability weighting.
Stability. To assess whether risk attitudes are stable over time on the aggregate level,
we compared the estimates for α and γ across the two test dates. There are no significant
differences in risk aversion or probability weighting between the two test dates (Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank Tests, all p ≥ 0.174). In order to evaluate individual test-retest stability,
parameter estimates obtained at test date 1 were correlated with those obtained at test
date 2. Figure 2 illustrates the test-retest data for α and γ using scatterplots with uni-
variate histograms. As is evident from the scatterplots, test-retest correlations are high
(Spearman’s Rho ≥ 0.73, see Table 8 for details). Thus, subjects who display strong
19
Table 8: Risk Attitudes - Reliability and Stability
Within-Session Correlations Test-Retest
Split-Half Reliability Correlation Date 1
Test Date 1 (N = 144) Test Date 2 (N = 53) with Date 2 (N = 53)
α 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.77***
γ 0.78*** 0.83*** 0.73***
Note.
*** p < .001; intercorrelations (Spearman’s Rho) of parameter estimates
from two non-overlapping subsets of lotteries within the same test session, both
for test date 1 and test date 2 (Within-Session Correlations). Test-retest
correlations of parameters estimated at two separate test dates using the same
choice set (Test-Retest).
risk aversion and high probability weighting at one test date do so also at the other test
date.16 We also looked at test-retest correlations for the individual certainty equivalents of
all lotteries. They range from Spearman’s Rho = 0.36 to Spearman’s Rho = 0.68 and are
thereby somewhat lower than the correlations for the aggregate measures. Hence, aggre-
gating choice data from several decisions seems valuable as it increases the reproducibility
of the results. This observation could also explain why we observe higher stability than
Andersen et al. (2008b), who used a single multiple price list. In our view, this also il-
lustrates that it is important to establish reliability of a measurement technique before
assessing stability over time. If reliability at one test date is unknown, low stability over
time can be either due to high measurement error or due to true fluctuations over time.
Domain Specificity. Investigating how the tested measures relate to other measures of
risk attitudes is important for assessing their ecological validity. Moreover, it can also be
informative for a better understanding of the nature of risk attitudes in different domains
of life. We correlated the parameter estimates from the lottery choice task with the
answers to selected risk questions of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) discussed
16Interestingly, our test-retest correlations are comparable to those reported for the Balloon Analogue
Risk Task (White et al. 2008), a behavioral measure of risk attitudes commonly employed in the psycho-
logical literature.
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Note: For both parameters, the estimate derived at the second test date is plotted as a function of the
estimate from the first test date, together with univariate histograms of each estimated parameter. Cloud
is jittered.
Figure 2: Test-Retest Data for Risk Attitudes.
in Section 2 (Table 3).17 These questions were chosen because they have been shown to
correlate well with revealed field behavior in the specified domains.
Table 9 reports the correlations of date 1 estimates of individuals’ α and γ with their
answers to the various risk questions. It shows that correlations with attitudes towards risk
in general and the sum of scores of all risk questions are highly significant but moderate
in size (Spearman’s Rho between 0.26 and 0.34). The same holds for the risk question
regarding the specific domains financial investments (Spearman’s Rho 0.27 and 0.30) and
confidence in strangers (Spearman’s Rho 0.23 and 0.19). In these domains, subjects who
report to take more risks show also less risk aversion and less deviations from linear
probability weighting in the lottery choice task. However, risk attitudes elicited with
the lottery choice task are entirely uncorrelated to self-reported attitudes towards risk in
other domains such as car driving, leisure and sports activities, and health.18 This strongly
17Table A.3 in Appendix A reports the test-retest correlations for this questionnaire in our sample.
These are generally high.
18These results seem robust as we replicated these findings in an entirely independent sample (see
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Table 9: Correlations of Risk Attitudes with Self-Reported Risk Taking
Attitudes Towards Risk (N = 144)
In Driving Financial Leisure Sum
General a Car Investments & Sports Career Health Strangers Score
α 0.34*** 0.07 0.27 ** 0.10 0.18* 0.11 0.23** 0.31***
γ 0.31*** 0.09 0.30*** 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.19* 0.26**
Note.
*** (**) {*} p < .001 (p < .01) {p < .05}; correlations (Spearman’s Rho) at test date 1.
suggests that individual risk attitudes are domain specific.
To summarize, we find that parameter estimates for risk aversion and probabil-
ity weighting parameters obtained from lottery tasks show high correlation across non-
overlapping (split-half) sets of lotteries. Further, test-retest correlations over an interval
of 5–10 weeks are high for risk aversion as well as probability weighting. This shows that
the used lottery choice task measures important aspects of risk attitudes with satisfactory
reliability and that behavior in this task is remarkably stable over time even on the individ-
ual level. The evidence regarding ecological validity and generalizability of the investigated
measures is mixed, however. On the one hand, estimates of risk aversion and probability
weighting both correlate statistically significantly with overall (self-reported) risk taking
as well as with risk taking in the financial domain, which may be considered as similar to
the examined lottery tasks. On the other hand, these correlations are economically only
moderately significant. Moreover, for domains that are very dissimilar from money lottery
tasks, risk taking is not at all correlated with the estimated parameters. Hence, it seems
that attitudes toward risk are highly domain specific and different domains may demand
different measures for reliably assessing risk taking behavior.19
Table A.4).
19For recent evidence suggesting a similar interpretation of risk taking behavior see Barseghyan and
Prince (2011), Dohmen et al. (2011), and Einav et al. (2012).
22
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We provide empirical evidence on the reliability, stability, and domain specificity for be-
havioral measures that are frequently used to elicit time preferences and risk attitudes
in economic experiments. First, we find that parameters values for time discounting,
risk aversion, and probability weighting, estimated from mutually exclusive subsets of the
choice tasks are highly correlated, indicating that these behavioral measures are reliable
and provide reproducible estimates. Second, all three estimated measures show high test-
retest correlations over a period of 5–10 weeks. Together with the established reliability
of the explored measures this allows us to conclude that the elicited attitudes are stable
at least over the tested period. Third, we find that discount rates elicited with a mone-
tary decision task correlate with self-reports on excess spending and low savings but not
with those for other domains, like general planning abilities and self-control. Similarly,
we observe that risk attitudes elicited with a lottery choice task correlate most with self-
reported attitudes towards risks in financial investments but are largely unrelated with
risk attitudes in other important domains of life, like health and leisure.
Together our results indicate that the explored measures may be well-suited for pre-
dicting field behavior regarding financial decisions involving time and risk trade-offs but
ill suited when it comes to behavior outside the narrow financial realm.
In our study, we measure time and risk preferences independently. However, time
preferences may be intertwined with risk preferences (Frederick et al. 2002, Andersen
et al. 2008a, Andreoni and Sprenger 2012b, Epper and Fehr-Duda 2013), in which case
discount rates should correlate with risk aversion. We observe only a small and marginally
significant correlation between the discount rate and the risk aversion parameter. Subjects
that are less risk averse tend to be more patient.20 The portion of explained variance is
small, however. This suggests that risk inherent to future payoffs governs intertemporal
decision making only to a small extent. Alternatively, as we find, people react differently
to various forms of risk, and this may also apply to the risk inherent in an intertemporal
choice as opposed to a lottery choice task.
20For details, see Table A.6 in Appendix A.
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We cannot control for credit constraints of our subjects. Therefore, the observed
correlation of excess spending and low savings with discounting could arise from current
cash constraints of these subjects. However, Meier and Sprenger (2010a) found that
present-biased preferences in an intertemporal choice task were associated with increased
credit card debt even after controlling for credit constraints. This indicates that cash
constraints are not the only factor driving the association between intertemporal choice
in the laboratory and spending behavior.
We provide evidence for the relation of behaviorally elicited preference parameters
with conceptually related self-report scales. When evaluating the association between
self-report instruments and behavioral measures of the same construct it is important to
consider the differences in methodology (Campbell and Fiske 1959, Robins et al. 2007).
Self-report scales might only imperfectly reflect subjects’ true dispositions because self-
reports can be distorted by motives like self-enhancement. Further, self-report scales
like the BIS-11 focus on traits, which prompts subjects to reflect on their habits across
different situations. Therefore, we have carefully chosen questionnaires which have been
validated to correlate with behavior in domains of interest. Nevertheless, the identified
correlations may establish only a lower bound for the true relational strength, as the
behavioral measures may be influenced by situational factors, such as task-specificity or
the current financial situation of the subject.
We find that measures of individual time preferences and risk attitudes are stable
over time, but not across different decision domains. This strongly suggests that these
individual characteristics are domain specific. Hence, in order to make good predictions,
the differences as well as similarities of preferences and behavior in different domains of
life need to be more accurately understood. Therefore, an important avenue for future
research would be to more systematically explore the domain specificity of time preferences
and risk attitudes and to establish preference elicitation tasks that possess high predictive
validity across as well as within different decision domains.
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A Additional Descriptive Statistics and Tests
Table A.1: Comparison of the Retested and Not-
Retested Subsamples at Test Date 1
Median K-S M-W
not retested (N = 89) retested (N = 53) p p
ρ1 0.00821 0.00821 0.345 0.919
ρ2 0.00821 0.00821 0.951 0.354
ρ3 0.00737 0.00737 0.782 0.587
not retested (N = 91) retested (N = 53) p p
α 0.790 0.693 0.178 0.071
γ 0.429 0.391 0.506 0.263
Note. Comparison of the discount rates and risk
attitudes for retested and non-retested subsamples,
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (K-S) and
Mann-Whitney Test (M-W). No test indicates
significant differences between retested and not
retested subsamples.
Table A.2: Test Retest Correlations of Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (N = 53)
Total Subscale Item 8 Item 10 Item 25 Item 27
Score Nonplanning Self-Control Saving Spending Present
Test-Retest
Correlation 0.869*** 0.855*** 0.317* 0.735*** 0.627*** 0.558***
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05; correlation statistics are
Spearman’s Rho.
Table A.3: Test-Retest Correlations of General Risk Questions
Attitudes Towards Risk (N = 53)
In Driving Financial Leisure Sum
General a Car Investments and Sports Career Health Strangers Score
Test-Retest
Correlation 0.813*** 0.818*** 0.677*** 0.540*** 0.688*** 0.792*** 0.708*** 0.763***
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05; correlation statistics are Spearman’s Rho.
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Table A.4: Correlations of Risk Attitudes with Self-Report Items in In-
dependent Sample
Attitudes Towards Risk (N = 128)
In Driving Financial Leisure Sum
General a Car Investments and Sports Career Health Strangers Score
α 0.28** 0.14 0.30*** 0.09 0.22* 0.07 0.27** 0.31***
γ 0.22* 0.11 0.29** 0.08 0.16 −0.03 0.16 0.22*
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05; correlation statistics are Spearman’s
Rho; data were obtained from an entirely independent sample and measured in
exactly the same way as reported in the main text.
Table A.5: Correlations of Discount Rates with Self-Report
Items in Independent Sample
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (N = 128)
Total Subscale Item 8 Item 10 Item 25 Item 27
Score Nonplanning Self-Control Saving Spending Present
Averageρ 0.13 0.19* 0.26** 0.39*** 0.30*** 0.02
ρ1 0.14 0.18* 0.24** 0.37*** 0.29*** 0.07
ρ2 0.04 0.12 0.23** 0.32*** 0.22* 0.01
ρ3 0.12 0.16 0.20* 0.33*** 0.27** −0.03
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05; correlation statistics are
Spearman’s Rho; data were obtained from an entirely independent
sample and measured in exactly the same way as reported in the main
text.
Table A.6: Correlation of
Time Preferences with Risk
Preferences
α γ
Average ρ −0.14a -0.09
ρ1 −0.16
a -0.11
ρ2 −0.15
a -0.11
ρ3 −0.05 -0.01
N=142
Note.
a p < .1
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B Self-Report Scales
Table B.1: Items of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al.
1995)
Order Itema Subscale
1 I plan tasks carefully.b Nonplanning
2 I do things without thinking. Motor
3 I make up my mind quickly. Motor
4 I am happy go-lucky. Motor
5 I don’t pay attention. Attention
6 I have “racing” thoughts. Attention
7 I plan trips well ahead of time.b Nonplanning
8 I am self-controlled.b Nonplanning
9 I concentrate easily.b Attention
10 I save regularly.b Nonplanning
11 I squirm at plays or lectures. Attention
12 I am a careful thinker.b Nonplanning
13 I plan for job security.b Nonplanning
14 I say things without thinking. Nonplanning
15 I like to think about complex problems.b Nonplanning
16 I change jobs. Motor
17 I act “on impulse”. Motor
18 I easily get bored when solving thought problems. Nonplanning
19 I act on the spur of the moment. Motor
20 I am a steady thinker.b Attention
21 I change residences. Motor
22 I buy things on impulse. Motor
23 I can only think about one problem at a time. Motor
24 I change hobbies Attention
25 I spend or charge more than I earn. Motor
26 I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking. Attention
27 I am more interested in the present than in the future. Nonplanning
28 I am restless at the theatre or lectures. Attention
29 I like puzzles.b Nonplanning
30 I am future oriented.b Motor
a Subjects rated each item on the following 4-point rating scale: 1
(rarely/never) 2 (occasionally) 3 (often) 4 (always/almost always).
b Item scoring was reversed.
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C Experiment Instructions
The experiment was fully computerized. The following shows the computer screens with
instructions, choice tasks, and questionnaires as presented to the subjects.
34
35
In total subjects went through 27 of such intertemporal choice tasks. The other tasks
and the order of tasks can be found in Table 1 of the main text.
36
37
In total subjects went through 20 of such lottery choice tasks. The other tasks and the
order of tasks can be found in Table 2 of the main text.
38
Next to the intertemporal and lottery choice tasks, subjects also participated in the
independent choice tasks described as Part 3 and Part 4 below. We do not report on data
gathered in these parts in the current paper.
39
40
41
42
43
At this point subjects first answered the “Barratt Impulsiveness” questionnaire (see
Table B.1 in Appendix for the list of questions) followed by the “Attitudes Towards
Risk” questionnaire (see Table 3 in the main text for the list of questions).
44
45
46
47
